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Imperfect Remedies: Legislative Efforts to Prevent
Genetic Discrimination
Timothy J Aspinwall*
The challenge of providing fair access to
affordable health care is a perennial political issue in
the United States. One component of the ongoing
debate is how to define and implement the
appropriate uses of medical advances.
Genetic
medicine is one area that most agree holds great
promise to provide cost-effective care. The huge
potential of genetic medicine has, however, been
impeded by genetic discrimination. The effort to
prevent genetic discrimination has resulted in two
recent pieces of federal legislation-one has become law, and one is
pending as part of the larger health care reform bill.
The Genetic Information Nondiscrimination Act of 2008 (GINA) was
signed into law by George W. Bush in May 2008, after having passed
through both houses of Congress with broad bipartisan support.1 GINA
helps to ensure affordable access by providing significant protections
against genetic discrimination in health care and employment.
The
protections afforded by GINA could be largely subsumed by the protections
that would be provided in the health care reform legislation pending in
Congress. For purposes of this discussion a review of the pending
legislation will include only the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act
(PPAC) recently passed in the U.S. Senate. 2
As compared to PPAC, GINA provides incomplete protection in that it
allows some forms of continued genetic discrimination. Both pieces of
legislation are imperfect largely because protections against genetic
discrimination result in forced transfers of wealth between private parties in
ways that are not explicit in either piece of legislation, nor acknowledged in
the Congressional findings. These limitations, however, do not detract from
the importance of the imperative to end genetic discrimination.
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1. Pub. L. No. 110-233 § 102(b)(1)(B) 122 Stat. 881 (2008).
2. H.R. 3590, 111 th Cong. (2009).
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The history of genetic discrimination in the United States is shameful.
The Congressional findings accompanying GINA offer a small glimpse of
our problematic history of genetic discrimination.3 Beginning with the first
sterilization law enacted by the State of Indiana in 1907, and then followed
by similar statutes in a majority of states by 1981, the laws were a
misguided effort to eliminate supposedly undesirable genetic traits.4 The
Congressional findings point out that genetic discrimination has frequently
impacted ethnic minorities.5 In the early 1970's the proliferation of state
laws requiring mandatory screening of all African Americans for sickle cell
anemia contributed to employment discrimination against African
Americans. An example, although not referenced in the Congressional
findings, is that both the U.S. Air Force and major commercial airlines
previously excluded sickle cell carriers from service as pilots on the false
premise that carriers are subject to high altitude sickle cell anemia attacks.
To help prevent specific types of discrimination, Congress in 1972 passed
the National Sickle Cell Amenia Control Act, which, among other things,
withholds monies from states that have compulsory sickle cell testing.6 The
Congressional findings also point out more recent instances of genetic
discrimination in the workplace exemplified by the use of pre-employment
genetic testing.7
In enacting GINA, Congress found that it has a "compelling public
interest in relieving the fear of discrimination and in prohibiting its actual
practice in employment and health insurance. ' 8 In so finding, Congress
noted that ".

. .[w]hile

many states have enacted some type of genetic non-

discrimination law, these laws vary widely with respect to their approach,
application, and level of protection.... [t]he American public and the
medical community find the existing patchwork of State and Federal laws
'9
to be confusing and inadequate to protect them from discrimination."
GINA is intended to establish a basic uniform standard of protection against
discrimination.
GINA provides the following protections. First, health insurers in the
individual and group markets are prohibited from basing eligibility
decisions or rate setting on genetic information. Second, employers with
fifteen or more employees are prohibited from basing hiring, firing, or
3. Pub. L. No. 110-233 § 2.
4. See 1907 Ind. Acts page no. 377, available at https://scholarworks.iupui.edu/handle/
1805/1053.
5. Pub. L. No. 110-233 § 2.
6. Pub. L. No. 92-294, 86 Stat. 138 (1972).
7. See Norman-Bloodsaw v. Lawrence Berkeley Lab., 135 F.3d 1260, 1269 (9th Cir.
1988) (favoring employees' rights to genetic privacy).
8. Pub. L. No. 110-233 § 2(4).
9. Id. § 2(5).
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promotional decisions on genetic information. For purposes of this statute,
genetic information is defined as: (i) individual genetic tests; (ii) genetic
tests of family members of such individuals; and (iii) the manifestation of a
disease or disorder in family members of such individual.10
Although GINA provides significant protections against genetic
discrimination, there are notable gaps in coverage. First, GINA does not
prohibit health insurers in either the individual or group markets from
basing rate-setting decisions on the manifestation of a disease or disorder.
It is an unfortunate irony that insurers are free to increase rates precisely at
the point when individuals most need affordable coverage-when a genetic
disorder becomes manifest. Second, GINA does not protect against the use
of genetic information in the context of long-term care insurance, disability
insurance, or life insurance. As a consequence of these broad exceptions to
the protections afforded by GINA, individuals still have much at risk in
deciding whether to undergo potentially beneficial genetic testing and
treatment. To the extent that an individual may wish to obtain long term
care insurance, disability insurance, or life insurance, and to the extent that
the premium levels or availability of coverage are based on genetic
information, individuals might quite reasonably decide to forgo potentially
beneficial genetic testing rather than obtain information that could exclude
them from the coverage they may need or result in cost prohibitive
premiums.
The ongoing possibility of genetic discrimination creates disincentives
for individuals to undergo potentially beneficial testing and treatment. This
makes it less likely that patients, clinicians, and researchers will benefit
from the full potential of genetic medicine. The fact that certain forms of
genetic discrimination are not prohibited is a partial defeat of Congress'
stated objective of relieving the fear of genetic discrimination.
PPAC would provide greater protections from genetic discrimination in
health care insurance in that it would: (i) strictly limit the actuarial bases
upon which premium levels are set to criteria such as rating areas, an
individual's age, and tobacco use; (ii) guarantee the issuance and
renewability of coverage; and (iii) prohibit discrimination against
individuals based upon criteria including health status, medical condition,
medical history, genetic information, or disability.11 These protections are
quite comprehensive, but not without controversy.
As with almost all health care legislation, GINA and PPAC represent an
uneasy balance between competing interests. It is clear that GINA provides
only partial protection against genetic discrimination. Is this a fair and
reasonable status quo, or is it simply one more step toward more complete
10.
11.

Id. § 201(4)(a).
H.R. 3590, 111 t Cong. (2009).

Published by LAW eCommons, 2010

3

Annals of Health Law, Vol. 19 [2010], Iss. 1, Art. 25

124

Annals of Health Law - 25th Anniversary Special Edition [Vol. 19

protections? Should individuals be entitled to the greater protection against
genetic discrimination as provided by PPAC, or should insurers have more
freedom to base underwriting decisions upon all relevant informationincluding genetic information?
The purpose of health care insurance is to allow individuals to obtain
health care at a predictable and affordable cost. Insurers also seek
predictability by setting premium levels based on actuarial data. Indeed,
insurers are generally prohibited from charging different premiums for
different groups or individuals without actuarial justification.
This
requirement of actuarial equity helps ensure the solvency of insurance
carriers and prevents unfair discrimination in pricing. These are settled
principles of insurance underwriting and are included in the Model Laws by
the National Association of Insurance Commissioners. In this light, it is
quite reasonable and actuarially equitable for insurance carriers to take into
account genetic information in setting insurance premiums.
This requirement of actuarial equity, however, is a challenge to the social
objective of maximizing the benefits of genetic medicine and more
specifically, the congressional intent of removing genetic discrimination. In
this respect, Congress has essentially said that the social interest in
preventing genetic discrimination in health care far outweighs the principle
of actuarial equity.
This argument, based on principles of moral equity, has substantial
appeal. The essential point is that actuarial equity fails to take into account
the moral inequity of increasing premiums on persons who suffer from
genetic conditions through no fault of their own. This moral argument,
however, must contend with another dilemma, which is that the prohibitions
against accessing and using genetic information will create an imbalance of
information where the insured has more information than the insurance
carrier. The problem is that the imbalance of the information creates
opportunities for individuals to game the system. For example, any person
who discovers that he or she has a genetic susceptibility to a potentially
devastating disease will be incentivized to purchase more comprehensive
health care insurance then they otherwise would-at a price that does not
reflect the actuarial risk.
The fact that a person can obtain health care insurance at an affordable
price is a laudable outcome. The mechanism by which this is achieved is
not so uncontroversial. The practical effect of the prohibitions against
genetic discrimination is that insurance carriers will have medical losses
that they cannot predict based upon individual data. Insurers will be forced
to aggregate their losses, which will be reflected in increased premiums for
all policyholders rather than for those who present the increased risk.
In a very real way, GINA and PPAC result in a transfer of wealth
between private parties by government fiat. There is simply no way to
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avoid the fact that prohibitions against genetic discrimination will require
that those who do not have genetic conditions will subsidize the cost of
coverage for those who do. That Congress has chosen to impose this crosssubsidy represents a choice that it is better for society to spread the risk
rather than allow individuals with genetic conditions to suffer the double
misfortune of not having affordable health care. In a more perfect system,
however, these transfers of wealth would be more transparent and would
not require one group-in this instance, private insurance policyholders-to
bear the burden of socially desirable health care reform.
The imperative to eliminate genetic discrimination enjoys broad-based
support. Perhaps as a practical matter, GINA and the pending provisions in
PPAC represent the best possible remedy to the problem of genetic
discrimination. This seems especially true given that one of the most
frequently cited alternatives to further insurance regulation is to provide
wider access to government health care programs. Such efforts have proven
to be politically challenging, to say the least.
Importantly, however, there is a general recognition that the full benefits
of genetic medicine can only be realized if people are protected from
discrimination that may accompany genetic testing and treatment. For this
purpose, GINA is an advance from the previous status quo. To the extent
that individuals remain subject to genetic discrimination in health care, the
Congressional objectives of GINA have not been fully met. Perhaps
pending legislation will provide a more complete, albeit imperfect, remedy.
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